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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WIL.MITH J. REES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.MURRAY CF£.lY BOARD OF EDUCATION, .a corporate body, and WENDELL
C. DAY, EARL HEALY, DAVID B.
McCLEERY, PAD"L S. ROSE, LAWRENCE P. PARRY, J. EASTON PARRATT and VARIAN :MORTENSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

C~e

No.

8586

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal fro1n a Smnmary Judgment Order
by the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, in f.avor of all defendants and
against plaintiff on her First Cause of Action, no cause
for action, and in favor of all defendants except J.
Easton Parratt and Varian Mortenson and against
3
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plaintiff on her Second Cause of Action, no cause for
action.
The entire record below was designated for this
appeal.
The appellant, Wihnith J. Rees, wa:s first employed
in 1949 by the Murray City Board of Education as a
teacher in Murray High School for the 1949-50 school
year. Similar contracts were made for the school years
1950-51, 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1953-54, copies of which
were filed with the Complaint (R. 6-10).
On March 29, 1954, without having any previous
warning from the Board of Education, appellant received
the following letter from Superintendent J. Easton
Parratt ( R. 39) :
''Dear l\{rs. Rees :
You, no doubt, are making plans for next
year. Accordingly the Board of Education is of
the opinion that it would be to your interest to
know that the board is not planning on entering
into a new contract ·with you for the school year
1954-55.

'Ve are pleased to have had the opportunity
of working and becmuing acquainted with you
during the past few years.
Very truly yours,

J. Easton Parratt
Superintendent & Clerk"
llistorically, .all teacher contracts by the Murray City
Board of Education provided that each teacher will be
4
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given "notice of unsatisfactory work on or before April
1 of the school year." (R. 6-10, paragraph 5 of each
contract).
On April 8, 1954, after receiving this notice, Mrs.
Rees requested a hearing before the J\!Iurray City Board
of Education at its next Ineeting (R. 54). On May 13,
1954, after some postponements, appellant appeared at
the Arlington School, Murray, Utah, at 7:30 o'clock P.M.
with her counsel for the purpose of protesting the board's
action and found the board had met between the hours of
7:00 o'clock P.M. and 7:25 o'clock P.M. that evening, and
were not available at 7:30 o'clock P.M. for appellant's
hearing. This was later claimed to be a misunderstanding by the board of education (R. 60). Aware that she
was getting the run around and her efforts for reinstatement were futile, J\IIrs. Rees commenced this action on
July 8, 1954, alleging the l\iurray City Board of Education's action was wrong, that the board should be enjoined from discharging her, and that the actions of the
board in refusing to issue her a new contract for the next
school year be declared null and void. Her Complaint also sought damages against the board members, superintendent and principal individually for malicous interference with appellant's contractual rights (R. 11). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was heard June
11, 1956. No testimony was taken, but all of the pleadings, exhibits, .affidavits and depositions of the parties
were made of record.
Mrs. Rees's allegations of fact in her Complaint (R.
1-5) and her supporting Affidavits (R. 48-50), though
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contradicted by Affidavits filed by the defendants must
be accepted as true on a b1otion for Summary J udgment.1
Appellant sets forth the facts from this standpoint.
I. APPELLANT AT ALL TIMES RENDERED SATISFACTORY SERVICE AS A TEACHER.

Wilmith Rees, a United States citizen and a resident
of Salt Lake City, Utah, graduated from the University
of Utah in 1949, and at all times held a profes~ional
certificate as provided by state law in order to qualify
as a teacher in the public schools of Utah. She was employed as a home economics teacher and performed her
responsibilities satisfactorily. With the consent and approval of the ~Iurray City Board of Education, while so
employed, she served as first Vice President and later as
President of the Murray Education Association; was a
member of the Utah State !lome Economics Committee,
Murray City High School Special Building Committee,
Murray City Schools Survey Committee and Murray
City Guidance Conunittee. Added to these activities,
she performed other extra curricular duties for the Murray City High School, with the consent of the Board,
in school fashion shows, cmumencement exercises, girls'
league, Freshn1an Advisory and Report Card Committee
activities.
1. Furton v. City of Mena~ha, ·C.C.A. 7 1945; 149 F. 2d 945;
Cert. denied, 327 U.S. 771. On defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, court must accept allegation of Complaint as true.
Facts must be accepted as true though contradicted by affidavit
filed by defendants.
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Mrs. Rees alleged in her Affidavit (R. 49) that at no
tin1e did her superintendent, principal or anyone else
ever give her notice of unsatisfactory work, and she
further denied specifically each and every implication
raised by counter affidavits filed by defendants Exhibits
I, J, K, L (R. 35-38) wherein the Board of Education attempted to suggest that she was not performing satisfactorily.
The trial judge at the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, aware that just cause for dismissing
Mrs. Rees was lacking, requested that counsel for the
board concede for the purpose of that hearing that, "Mrs.
Rees was discharged because she played around with
the Teachers' Union." Mrs. Rees's allegation that she
"rendered satisfactory and successful service to said
Murray City High School and Murray City Board of
Education" (R. 3) Inust be taken in a light most favorable
to her.
II. INDUCEMENTS HELD OUT TO MRS. REES TO
BECOME A TEACHER.
~Irs.

Rees's Affidavit (R. 49) alleged that it was her
understanding when employed by Dr. James Clove, then
Superintendent of the Murray City Board of Education,
that there was, in effect, a tenure policy for its teachers
which was as set forth in defendants' Exhibits A and B
(R. 22, 23), and in her Exhibit 1 (R. 51), and that upon
rendering three years satisfactory status as a teacher
she would acquire by contractual right with the Murray
City Board of Education the tenure right to hold her
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job, together with a right to an orderly dismissal procedure if the board attempted either to discharge her or
not to renew her contracts. Dr. Clove's deposition admits
Mrs. Bees's understanding and reliance of the policy,
explaining Exhibit A & B (R. 22, 23) to conform to the
Board of Education's tenure policy. (See Clove Deposition, p. 6 commencing at line 15 and extending through
line 23 of p. 8.)
III.

APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AS A TENURE TEACHER.

1frs. Rees filed with her }lotion in opposition, the
Affidavit of Herrick S. Roth, Vice President of the
American Federation of Teachers, setting forth definitions of the tern1s Dr. Clove's employment letter raised.
"Probation period" and "tenure" have the following
meaning (R. 59) :
"The word 'tenure' when applied to the employnlent of a teacher indicates that the teacher
will be employed fron1 the date of achieving tenure, continuou.sly fron1 year to year, until such
time as the teacher reaches the retirement age for
the school district."
"The tenn does not ilnply that the teacher
shall never be subject to disn1issal once he has
attained the status of tenure. Tenure does provide for an orderly procedure for determining
whether or not a disn1issal of a teacher who has
attained the status of tenure is warranted by the
board of education."
that a hearing should be had after notice
the teacher concerning grounds for reBwv.al or non-rene\\·al of the contract. •••"

"* ·' *
gj YPn to
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"The burden of proof of dismissal or nonrenewal rests with those who bring the charge."
Mrs. Rees denied that the term "Probation period"
or "Tenure" had the meaning alleged to be given those
terms by Me.ssrs. Par~att, Day and Parry in their affidavits supporting their motion. Mrs. Rees further alleged that following her three year probation period she
acquired tenure, and that this policy was a long standing
policy of the Murray City Board of Education; that such
a policy had been recognized during her employment regarding the non-renewal of another tenure teacher (a
Mr. Tremayne).
Mrs. Rees also denied that the tenure policy was not
applicable to married teachers and alleged that the action by the bo.ard was not predicated on the ground that
she was replaced for a single female teacher or that the
married women's rule had any materiality or relevancy
to the matter.
IV.

DEFENDANTS'

ARBITRARY

ACTIONS.

Notwithstanding Mrs. Rees's beter than average
record of service to her high school .and community from
1949, Mur~ay Board of Education, acting upon Superintendent Parratt's and Principal ~Iortenson's recommendation, filed its dismissal notice two days before the
final date allowed by the contract, without giving any
reason for their action, and refusing Mrs. Rees the
orderly hearing required by ordinary justice (R. 60) .
.Mrs. Rees continued to request reinstatmnent by the
.:\lurray City Board throughout, continues to hold a good
9
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S'tanding teacher's certificate and continues to this date
to be without employment as a teacher, although she has
.applied to the Salt Lake City Board, Jordan Board and
the Granite School Board, an alarming conrmentary in
itself when viewed in connection with the admitted critical shortage of competent teachers in this state.
V.

STATUTES.

School laws of Utah are silent regarding teacher
tenure. Section 53-6-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
broadly provides:
"Every board of education shall have power
and authority *** to construct and erect school
buildings and to furnish the same • • • and may
do all things needful for the maintenance, prosperity .and success of the schools and the promotion of education; and may adopt by-laws and
rules for its own procedure, and make and enforce
all needful rules and regulations for the control
and management of the public schools of the district.''
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953, First Special Session, p. 70, provides :
.. Bo.ards of education of local school districts
Inay enter into written contracts for the employment of personnel for tenns not to exceed five
years, provided that nothing in the tenus of such
contracts shall restrict the power of such local
boards to tenninate such contracts for cause at
any time."
This law was approved Dece1nber 9, 1953, and became
effective February 18, 1954.

10
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. .J\..ttention is also directed to Utah State Teachers'
Retirement Fund created by Chapter 20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE .COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED TO BE
FULLY TRIED ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

A. Plaintiff's Allegation that She was a Tenure
Teacher and had Acquired the Contractual Benefits of
Tenure was a ~1:-aterial Fact in Controversy.

POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO PREVAIL AS
A MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

A. In Establishing Tenure for its Teachers under
Contract of Employment, Murray City School Board was
not Acting Ultra Vires.
B. 1\Iurray City School Board failed to Act in
Accordance with its own Rules Regarding Orderly Dismissal of a r:l1 enure Teacher.
C. The Contract Covering the School Year 1953-54
was not Lacking in :Mutuality.
11
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D. The :Married 'reacher Rule did not Bar Appellant from Benefits of Tenure Program.
POINT III.
THE ·COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY HOLDING THAT MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
COULD NOT INDIVIDUALLY BE LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS
AND WILLFUL INTERFERENCE WITH APPELLANT'S
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ·COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED TO BE
FULLY TRIED ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

A. Plaintiff's Allegation that She was a Tenure
Teacher and had Acquired the Contractual Benefits of
Tenure was a :Material Fact in Controversy.
Like a general den1urrer under fonner rules of
pleading, the Motion for Sununary J udgn1ent cuts at
the he,art of appellant's claiin. Like a general den1urrer,
the Motion for Su1mnary J udgn1ent concedes the facts
alleged to be true. Sunnuary Judg1nent is not a substitute for trial. It only deter1nines whether there are issues
to be tried. Barron and Holtzolf, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Vol. 3, p. 61.
':Phe emnplaint, supporting affidavits and deposi-
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tions of Dr. Clove rai.se genuine and material issues of
fact, and the Court below should have accepted these
allegations as true although contradicted by affidavits
filed by defendants. lVIrs. Rees alleged the existence of a
tenure policy and an orderly dismissal procedure. The
contracts and docurnents which created this right accompanied her oomplaint.
Comntencing with the first contract (R. 6) and running through each of the renewals except Exhibit E (R.
10), paragraph 4 of each contract provided:
"This contract may be cancelled by mutual
agreement, and by the Board of Educ.ation for
imnlorality, incompetence, insubordination, and
mental or physical incapacity. It is agreed that
there shall be no discharge without a thorough
investigation and a hearing before the board."
As far as can be determined, this had been the standard
procedure in the Murray City School Board for some
years prior to 1949.
Each contract provided:
"5. That you will be given notice of unsatisfactory work on or before April 1 of the
school year."
The contract for the year 1953-54 carried a slightly
different provision:
"4. It is agreed and under.stood that each
person performing services hereunder rnay terminate his service relationship at any time upon his
giving written notice of such inte11tion and the
effective date thereof to the Board at least ten
days prior to the proposed effective date of termi-

13
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nation. Such notice 1nay be 1nailed or delivered
to the Superintendent."
The reason for this language requires explanation.
At the com1nencement of the 1953-54 school year in September, there was considerable agitation for improving
teachers' salaries throughout the state. Boards of education were unable to offer teachers adequate contracts,
and throughout the state many teachers and their associations refused to sign these contracts in time for the
new school year. This resulted in the call of a special
legislative session December 1, 1953, entirely devoted
to the solution of this problem. In order to show good
faith, Boards of Education throughout the state drafted
this language which, in effect, said to a teacher, if we
cannot get a satisfactory adjustment from the state legislature, you may resign on ten day's notice.
In this context, it is submitted that paragraph 4 of
the agreement of 1953-54 did not alter the previous basic
conditions that there could be no unilateral discharge
without a thorough investigation and hearing before the
board. It is urged these conditions becrune part of the
1953-54 contract, as effectively as if expressly written
therein for those teachers who had passed their probationary period.
Dr. J an1es Clove, fonner superintendent of the
board, hired ~irs. Rees. Hi~ forthright deposition .admits
that his hiring letter of April ~1, 1949, (R. 22) and the
docmnent entitled the Orderly Dis1nissal of Teachers,
Exhibit D (R. ~5-27), was standard operating proc-edure
in the ~lnrray City School Board. Nowhere in the affi-
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davit or the depositions of the pre.sent board or their
officers is there evidence that the policy under Dr. Clove
had been changed, altered or rescinded. This indicates
that the policy was acceptable and continued in effect.
(See Appeal of Black, 287 P. 2d 96, 101. Contract cannot be annulled by succeeding board members.)
What is the meaning of this language if not to gr.ant
tenure to Mrs. Rees 1 "The Board of Education has extended the probationary period of new teachers from one
year to three years to obtain tenure." This phrase is
again recited in the letter of April 19, 1950, Exhibit B
(R. 23), which accompanied the second contract Mrs.
Rees received from the board. Examine Dr. Clove's
deposition (P. 15, line 9 through page 17, line 14):
"Q.

A.

So that when you wrote this letter that we
have referred to earlier, advising teachers
that their probationary period would be extended from one to three years to obtain
tenure, you were meaning the kind of tenure
-not legal tenure-that came as an incident
of this three-page document?
That's right.

Q. In other words, before a teacher could be discharged she would have to be discharged
through .some orderly dismissal procedure Y
A.

As far as I was concerned, that was true.

Q.

And was that policy followed in any example
during your term?
A. Yes.

Q. In what cases?
A. Well, only one case that I ever dismissed a

15
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teacher was a teaoher by the name of Tremayne, and we followed it there.
Q.

Just exactly what was the procedure you followed in Mr. Tremayne's case1 I don't care
to know the issues or the merits of it.

A.

I wrote him a letter that he would not be reemployed; that in our opinion he was not a
capable teacher. That was his first year, and
there was still no need for taking it before the
board, according to this professional procedure. However, he requested it and it was
granted.

Q. And you went through the whole formal procedure!
A.

True.

Q.

Gave him a hearing?

A.

That's true.

Q.

And you presented the Board's position and
he presented his po.sition Y

A.

That's true.

Q.

And at the end of that, a decision was -

A.

It was unfavorable to the teacher. The Board
backed up our judgment.

Q.

I see. X ow, was there any other case of a dismissal of a teacher during your tern1 1

A.

No, no dis1nissal. A dozen teachers, however,
resigned at my suggestion during those years.
It was 1ny poliry that when a teacher was not
doing what 1 considered good work to tell
the teacher in a conference that I thought it
wa.~ for the best interests· of the teacher and
the district that the~· try s01nething else, go
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to another district, .and that the best procedure for the teacher would be to write a letter
stating that they didn't, that they were resigning, didn't want to come back next year,
and that I'd write them a letter accepting
their resignation. That put it all on record
as .a resignation and no dismissal.

Q.

So that in those instances no-

A.

It was officially resignation.

Q. Resignation rather than dismissal.
That's true.
Q. But even in those cases where this resignation
procedure was involved, you had some discussions prior to the resignation letter advising the teacher of her unsatisfactory conduct?
A. That's right.
Q. Did the Murray Board of Education know
about the Tremayne incident?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they support the action you took on it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they permit you to go through the procedure you used~
A. Yes, ~ir."
"Recommended Procedure for the Orderly Dismissal
of Teachers" was the policy and practice used during Dr.
Clove's term as superintendent. See Clove Deposition,
p. 18, line 12 through 18.
A.

In addition to that, Exhibit H adopted by the Murray City School Board in 1946 (R. 32, 33) attached to
the salary schedule (R. 34), provided:
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"V. Teachers Demerits
1.

Teachers whose work is rated by the
Principal and Superintendents as being
below the standard expected in Murray
City Schools may be denied their annual
increment.

2.

If the quality of work is rated below average for a two-year consecutive period,
the teacher shall not be given a contract
of re-en1ployn1ent in the Murray City
Schools. Such teachers will be given a
notice before April 1st if their work is
below average and that they are not entitled to their annual raises."

For the purpose of meeting her burden at the Summary Judgment hearing, :Mrs. Rees certainly established
a prima facie case for tenure, and having acquired the
incidence of that contractual relationship established
genuine and material issues of fact that should have been
fully tried, not disposed of simply because defendants'
affidavits contradicted these facts.
It is, of course, conceded that if defendants were
entitled to prevail as a n1atter of law, the Court below
did not err. This proposition will now be examined.

POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMl\lARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO PREVAIL AS
A MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

A.

In Establishing Tenure for its Teachers under
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Contract of Employment, 1furray City School Board was
not Acting Ultra Vires.
It is common knowledge since World War II, this
state has faced a serious teacher shortage primarily because of inability to pay teachers adequate wages and
permit conditions comparable to those offered by other
industries in other states. Tenure for teachers is
based upon the public policy of protecting the educational interest of the state and not upon the policy of
granting special privileges to teachers as a class or as
individuals. Consequently, tenure should be strictly construed against the boards and liberally construed to affect the high purpose of this public policy.
So, to 1neet this competition, Utah School Boards
attempted to better teachers' conditions within the public interest. Tenure had been under consideration for
many years, when in November, 1947, as an outgrowth
of the resolutions made at a leadership convention at
Cedar City, there was appointed a joint committee representing the State School Board As.sociation and the
Utah Education Association which studied the problems
and submitted its approved recommendations September
13, 1947. This constituted the recommended orderly dismissal procedure for teachers which was adopted by
about three-fourths of our .school districts in this state.
See The Administration of Public Education by Dr. John
T. Wahlquist, published by the Ronald Press Company,
~ew York, Chapter 7, p. 241:
"Many states and school systems have worked
out procedures to be followed in the dismissal of
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teachers. In Utah, for instance, the State School
Board Association and the Utah Education Association have cooperated in working out a procedure which has been adopted by about three-fourths
of the sehool districts in the state. The procedure
defines the grounds for dismissal, provides that
written notice of intended dismissal be given to
the teacher, and stipulates that the teacher may
request a hearing before the board of education
before final decision on the dismissal is made.
"Even though the problems discussed above
are influenced in large measure by state legislation and state board of education rulings, local
superintendents and principals can do much to
make this area of personnel administration more
effective. Regardless of tenure status, administrators, by their actions and programs, can give
teachers a feeling of security. Adequate supervision, particularly during the probationary period, can be provided. Board policies on retirement
ages, the teaching of controversial issues, and dismissal procedures can be fair and liberal."
Dr. Clove's deposition clearly establishes that the
Murray Board, by implication at least, adopted a similar
orderly dismissal procedure and held out this t.enure program as an induce1nent to Mrs. Rees to accept employment in its public school.
The school board injected into the relationship between !1:rs. Rees and itself her unexpressed right for
tenure by an implied contract that on the contingency
her relationship continued satisf·actorily for at least
three years, then she wa~ COilsidered a permanent teacher.
Should it be urged in the year 1956 the power of a
board .. to maintain it~ schools;· Section 53-6-20,

~chool
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, limits the implied powers of
a board to adopt such a relationship between itself and
its teachers~
See Allen u. Board of Education, 236 P. 2d 75:
"The Board of Education, being a creature
of the legislature, has *** such implied powers as
are necessary to execute and earry into execution
its implied powers.''
This Court in Backman v. Bateman, 263 P. 2d 561,
struck down an act of the legislature because it infringed
upon a vested tenure right to retirement by a high school
principal.
Defendants' counsel cited in the court below, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
"Boards of Education may appoint all other
officers that in their judgment may be necessary
to fully carry out the provisions of this title for
the protection and improvement of school property and for the promotion of the interests of the
schools may 'remove them at pleasure and may require any such officer to give a bond to the board
in such sum as it may prescribe."
Arguing this provision gives the school board unlimited
authority to re1nove any teacher at its pleasure. This
section applies only to officers of the board and not to
employees. The position of a teacher in the public school
is not a public office but an employ1nent by contract between the teacher and the school corporation. The relationship is contractual. l,his section may not be applied
against teachers; only against officers of the board.
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See School District No. 311 v. Wanamaker, (Wash.)
281 p. 2d 846.
It was also urged below that Laws of Utah, 1953,
First Special Session, Chapter 29, now cited as Section
53-4-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, constitutes a limitation against the Board. This section provides:
"Boards of Education, or local school districts, may enter into written contracts for the
employment of personnel for terms not to exceed
five years ; provided that nothing in the terms of
such contracts shall restrict the power of such
local boards to terminate such contracts for cause
at any time."
This is not inconsistent with our case. The 1953 act,
appellant contends, was not intended as a limitation on
the existing and implied powers of the board. The legislature was certainly aware that since 1948, nearly threefourths of Utah school districts had adopted a tenure
program and an orderly dismissal procedure. Neither
the message of the Governor, recommendations of the
legislative counsel, nor debates in the legislature are
helpful in determining whether or not this act was determined as a grant of new power or limitation of existing
and implied powers of the board. \V e contend that since
many schools in Utah had adopted tenure procedures
previous to 1953, the boards exercised the power to so
contract, and the above statutory provision was not a
liinitation on their power, but rnerely an .authority to
enter into written contracts for a tern1 of five years.
This is not inconsistent with the established practice
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of re-e1nploying a teacher on a year-to-year basis if she
perforn1s satisfactorily.
This Court's .attention is further called to the underlined portion of the statute which provides:

"To terminate such contracts for cause at any
tirrt,e."
Here again our legislature recognizes that just cause
must appear even if a contract for five years may be
terminated. Certainly, the principles of justice and fair
play require some hearing after notice given to the party
sought to be tenninated, dis1nissed or non-renewed. Our
legislature thus requires a hearing before "just cause
for termination'' is proven to exist.
Even in the absence of teacher tenure statutes, the
Supre1ne Court of Wyoming holds:
"The majority of the Courts ~eem to hold
that in the absence of .a contract permitting removal at pleasure, principles of justice require
that a hearing should be given to the party sought
to be removed and we shall assume for the purpose of this case that in order to make the decision
of the school board of any effect a hearing upon
notice was necessary." (See Tracy v. School District No. 5, 243 P. 2d 932.)
In Baird, 298 Pac. 313, that Court held:
"According to the Durst case, removal of a
teacher may be only for cause, and we may .assume, as heretofore stated, that it should be only
upon notice and hearing."
~ln;.

Rees was not charged with any unsatisfactory
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conduct nor was she allowed any of the fundamental
elements necessary for a fair hearing.
Furthermore, since appellant's rights arose out of
a contract with the Murray Board as the outgrowth of
existing and implied powers and not statutory grants,
it is urged that her right of tenure is not capable of being
dissolved by an act of the legislature even if this Court
construes Laws of Utah, 1953, Chapter 29, First Special
Session, as the only power of the board. A case in point
has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in favor of a school teacher. See State ex rel
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, reversing the Indiana
Supreme Court, 5 N.E. 2d 531. The Indiana Court held
teacher tenure rights as being a creature of the legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States held
otherwise:
"The teacher tenure_ rights were contractual
and could not be impaired by a subsequent act of
the legislature."
Mrs. Rees urges, therefore, that this last enactment
of the legislature cannot in1pair her vested right to tenure
which she obtained through a contract commencing in
1949, and continuing each year through 1953.
The full power and prestige of our state is being
used to encourage high level education and teachers to
do a better job. Recently a teacher retirement program
has been adopted hy this state which recognizes that
teachers 1nay be cmnpetent to serve until sixty and sixtyfive year~ of age. Utah sehool boards did not require a
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grant of legislative power to encourage teachers job
security and tenure. They have exercised this power all
along and their action is not without authority.
Anticipating that defendants would argue as they
did below that without a legislative grant of authority,
boards of education may only enter into contracts within
the term of office of that board, appellant makes the following argument.
In the absence of a statutory provision limiting
either expressly or by implication, the time for which a
contract of employment of a school teacher may be made
to a period within the contracting school board's or officers' term of office, such board or officers may bind their
successors in office by employing a teacher or superintendent for a period extending beyond their term of
office. See Appeal of Black, 298 P. 2d 96; 78 C.J.S. 185,
pp. 1038-39.
In Corum v. Common School District 1Vo. 21 (Idaho,
1935) 47 P. 2d 889, it was held:

"It is also contended that the contract was invalid by re~ason of the fact that it was entered
into prior to the annual school meeting, at which
a change in the personnel of the board occurred,
for services to cornn1ence and to be performed
after the annual n1eeting. This contention cannot
he upheld. The board of trustees of a co1nmon
school district has the power and it is its duty to
employ certified teachers on written contract in
form approved by the state board of educ~ation.
I.C.A. paragraphs 32-615, subd. 1. The board is a
continuous body or entity; the corporation contin25
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ues unchanged and has the power to contract; its
contracts are contracts of the board and not of its
individual members ; and the board can make a
valid contract with a teacher for a tenn of school
to begin in the next succeeding school year and
after the term of one of the trustees has expired."
This is the general rule, provided the contract is
made in good faith, without fraud or collusion and for a
reasonable period of time.
It cannot be successfully argued that a tenure program for teachers which is designed to continue her
annual contract from year to year until she reaches her
retirement age of sixty-five is unreasonable. Rather, it
must be conceded that such stability of employment is a
desirable thing and that boards of education are not
acting outside of their authority in establishing such
practice even in the absence of permissive legislation.
B. Murray City School Board failed to Act in
Accordance with its own Rules Regarding Orderly Dismissal of a Tenure Teacher.
If it is accepted that the Murray City School Board
adopted a tenure progran1, then it must recognize its
rules regarding the dismissal of a tenure teacher. All of
the contracts provided :
"That the Board will give the teacher a notice
of unsatisfactory work on or before April 1 of
the school year.'·
rrhi8 notice not only 8hould be in writing, but it mus1
have eontainPd a st:ate1nent of reasons for the board'~
n:>fusal to rP-Pltlplo~· the teaeher for the following year
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Any such notice not incorporating reasons for doing so
was void and did not fulfill the terms of the contract.
See Tempe Union High School District v. Hopkins,
262 P. 2d 387.
The notice given :Mrs. Rees that she would not be
re-employed as a teacher was insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of her contract and due process of law
under the circumstances of this case. · Teacher tenure is
a valuable, substantial right and cannot be taken away
except for good cause, once it is shown to exist.
See State ex rel Saxtorph v. District Court, Fergus
County, 275 P. 2d 209.
Furthermore, the :Murray City Board of Education
apparently continued the policies of Dr. Clove, and they
should be estopped from denying the validity of Mrs.
Rees's claims under the circumstances of this case.
See Lommasson v. School District No. 1, 261 P. 2d
861:
"But school boards are not unlike the governing boards of other municipalities and corporations, and may by their subsequent acts so adopt
or ratify contracts within the scope of their powers, informally entered into or executed, that the
districts for which they act will be estopped to
deny their validity. ***"
Finally, the board offered Mrs. Rees no hearing
at all even though her contracts from 1949 on contained
the provision that:

"*** there shall be no discharge without a
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thorough investigation and a hearing before the
board."
Once Mrs. Rees had acquired permanent rights as
a teacher, this right to a fair hearing, with the burden of
proof upon the board, became clearly fixed. That this
language was omitted from the 1953-54 contract has previously been explained and as previously urged is as
much a condition of that contract as if it had been expressly written in.
C. The Contract Covering the School Year 1953-54
was not Lacking in ~Iutuality.
The Court below raised this question, pointing out
that paragraph -1 of the 1953-54 contract permitted termination by the teacher upon giving ten day's written
notice.
This provision has been previously detailed in this
brief entirely for the benefit of the board because of the
financial bind the school districts were in a:t the opening
of that school tenn. School contracts had been mailed
out and had been unsigned and returned in many instances. The provision was written by the board and
should he strictly construed against it and not the teacher.
Does the inclusion of thi~ clause mean that the 1953·
5-l contract was so entirely lacking in 1nutu.ality of obligation that it should not be enforced f It is an ele1nentary
rule of contract law that unless both parties to a contract an' bound, neither is bound. So tested, it is apparent that :Mr~. Rees undertook to be bow1d to perfonn
tPaeltiHg :-;pryi(·l'~ !'or tlw bo.ard for a tern1 of one year.
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She entirely executed this contract. This is not a case
of promised future perfonnance by a party. Here, one
party agrees to render services in consideration of the
other's promise to pay. Mrs. Rees was never free to reject, change or alter her own performance unless she
exercised the ten day notice provision. There was nothing
vague or illusory about her promise or her performance
under that promise. The ten day reservation does not
render the contract lacking in mutuality.
D. The :Married Teacher Rule did not Bar Appellant from Benefits of Tenure Program.
The Court below was disturbed about the married
teachers rule. Exhibit C (R. 24) points out that the
policy for that year contains a married won1an's clause
which provides :
"The board of education may cancel this contract because of marriage of a female teacher
during the year."
The letter of March 17, 1950, written by Dr. Clove
establishes that any attempt to deny tenure to married,
female teachers ought to be accompanied with a showing
that there were unmarried teachers available for work.
The question of married teachers was an old controversy
having its roots in the war and postwar emergency and
employment prograrns. Actually, there are so few single
teachers now, male or fernale, there is no reason for a
return of the policy .and consequently to impose the rule.
Mrs. Rees was not disrnissed because she was a married
teacher. Continuing rnarried teachers in employment
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has caused no econornic problems for the board of edu.
cation. The fact is, school boards can use as many
teachers as are available without regard to whether they
are married or single.
It is important to point out that the contract for
1953-54 entirely eliminated paragraph 6 which had ap.
peared in the 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 contracts, but
which was not incorporated in the August 29, 1953, contract. See Exhibit 10.
Mrs. Rees urges that if her dismissal arose because
of her married status, such dismissal would be contrary
to good public policy and unreasonable. This is the
holding of State ex rel Wood v. Board of Education,
206 sw 2d 566.
In the opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 661, 222
NE 2d 49-57, 123 ALR 199, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court concludes that .a contract which would exclude
married women from public employment could have no
real tendency to advance the public welfare, and held
such statute unconstitutional.
Because of such basic unfairness, and reason for
the rule ce.ases to exist, ~Irs. Rees cannot be denied her
tenure right on the basis of the so-called married teacher's clause.

POINT III.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND·
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY HOLD·
ING THAT MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
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COULD NOT INDIVIDUALLY BE LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS
AND WILLFUL INTERFERENCE WITH APPELLANT'S
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT ON THE SE.COND CAUSE OF
ACTION.

Appellant's Second Cause of Action is predicated
upon the familiar Tort Law:
HOne who without privilege to do so induces
or otherwise purposely eauses a third person not
to (a) perform a contract with another or, (b)
enter into or continue a business relationship with
another, is liable to the other for the harm caused
thereby."
Re-.statement of Torts, Section 766.
The jist of appellant's claim on her Second Cause
of Action (See Amended Complain, R. 11) is that all
defendant.s wrongfully conspired .and interfered with
her right of contract for which she is entitled to damages from all who participate in such wrongful activity.
The unjustified conduct of all the defendants in
intefering with Mrs. Rees's contract and expectancy,
conceding that she had tenure rights, is the tort set forth
under her Second Cause of Action.
The Court below reasoned that defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment must be granted as against all
except Principal :Mortenson and Superintendent Parry,
conceding that as against those two defendants, Mrs.
Rees had stated a cause of action, but holding that the
Board of Education and its officers could not induce a
breach of it~ own contract with itself. This, we believe,
is an oversimplification. At least, the members of the
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board, acting outside the scope of their authority should
have personal liability for their wrongful and tortious
acts. Corporation officers are not shielded from individual liability merely because their unauthorized acts
are committed in the name of a corporation if they do or
participate in acts clearly wrongful. Contrary rule would
enable directors and officers of the corporation to perpetrate flagrant injustice behind the shield of this vicarious
cha:vacter, even though the corporation might be insolvent
or irresponsible. 13 Am. Jur. p. 1019, Sections 1086-87.
See Ca1neron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co.,
22 Mont. 312, 56 P.ac. 358.
,.
It is a general rule that a corporation should be
liable in damages to one injured by its acts brought about
by conspiracy among its board members or other persons.
13 Am. Jur. 1057, Section 1132; 4 ALR 166.
Murray City Board of Education is a public corpor,ate body having the right by statute to sue and be sued,
and it should be required to respond for its tortious conduct like any other corporation.

CONCLUSION
A careful review of the whole record demonstrates
what 1nay happen under the cloak of administrative
authority. l\f rs. Rees was a dedicated public servant
who taught satisfactorily for five full years and accepted
heavy Pxira-<'nlTieular activities for her school. In 1953,
she hriefl~· intt'rP~t('d herself in a respected labor organi-
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zation, The American Federation of Teachers, for which
she was deprived of her job and career. A review of the
whole record demonstrates that the defendants had absolutely no justification for their arbitrary action except
to punish Mrs. Rees for union interests and to forewarn
other teachers what might be their fate. 2
We are daily reminded of the need for more teachers, certified teachers and higher educational standards.
:More and more tax dollars are being requested to support
our public school program. By what prerogative may a
school board seek additional millions to improve its
program and .at the smne time frustrate its teachers as in
this case~ The tenure program which existed was the
:Murray School Board's own procedure. It shopld have
observed its procedure with a greater propriety.
Now, while public opinion is highest, and thoughtful
people are concerned about their public school program,
this Court should reverse the lower Court's rulings dismissing the First and Second Causes of Action and remand the ease for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

A. W. SANDACK
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant

2. Notwithstanding the contracts from 1949 through 1952
which provided that "you belong to the N.E.A., U.E.A. and
Murray Teacher Association."

33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

